Often it is desired that the power to sign or authenticate messages is shared. This paper presents methods to collectively generate RSA signatures, provably secure authenticators and unconditionally secure authenticators. In the new schemes, 1 individuals are given shares such that k 5 1 are needed to generate a signature (authenticator) but less than k can not. When the k people have finished signing (authenticating), nobody can perform an impersonation or substitution attack. These schemes are called threshold signature (authentication) schemes. Clearly these schemes are better than each of the L individuals sending a separate authenticator for each message or if each of the L individuals each send their share to a "trusted" person who will sign for them.
Introduction
T h e idea of combining cryptosystems with secret sharing (threshold) schemes [Bl, Sh] has been introduced in several papers recently [CH, DQV, DFSO] . Shared generation of authenticators using Diffie-Hellman [DH] was presented in [CHI, but it is completely insecure against substitution. Threshold decryption of private messages was introduced in [DF90] . Shared verification of authenticators was introduced in [DQV] , but the available message space is small. A n impodanl problem not discussed in ihese papers is the shared generation of secure signatures. Issuing checks for a corporation is a vivid example of this well-known problem. For security reasons, it may be a company's policy that checks be signed by k individuals rather than one person. An organization may choose 1 individuals and allow any subset consisting of k 5 1 people t o sign its checks. This is similar to the concept of threshold schemes [Bl, Sh] . This paper presents threshold (a) RSA signatures, (b) provably secure authenticators and (c) unconditionally secure authenticators. Using mental games [GMW] , this can be achieved conditionally but the scheme is highly interactive and very impractical.
Our paper presents techniques where k out of 1 individuals are required t o generate a signature (or authenticator) for a message. This is clearly better than having each of the k individuals create k signatures (authenticators) which would cause an increase in bandwidth overhead. The receiver would also be required to perform more calculations and store a larger key directory. No interaction between shareholders is necessary for the generation of signature (authenticator) and the secret key is not revealed to any individual even after signatures (or authenticators) have been created with our schemes. We assume that the shareholders (senders) and receiver have secure workstations but the network and servers are not necessarily secure. A byproduct of this research is a homomorphic group based threshold scheme (see Section 4.2).
Our threshold RSA signature scheme is based on interpolation polynomials over the integers (see Section 3). Even though there exists no threshold scheme over any infinite ring [BS] (see also [CK] ), our scheme is secure. A threshold signature scheme based on algebraic integers is also discussed.
RSA signatures [RSA] are weak and not proven secure [Da, Den, dJC, Mo] . Therefore, we present a proven secure solution for threshold authenticators (see Section 4) based on a new homomorphic threshold scheme over a finite Abelian group in which inverses can be calculated in polynomial time. These Abelian groups must have an exponent7 with large prime factors$; the exponent needs to only be known to the distribution center that makes the shares*.
A threshold unconditionally secure authentication scheme is presented (see Section 5).
It is based on finite geometry.
2 The model and notation Let (S, R) be a signature or an (interactive or non-interactive) authentication scheme, where S is the sender and R is the receiver. Instead of S , we have a set A (Id1 = 1) such that any subset 8, where If31 = k, can replace S as the signature (authenticator) generator. Each time S would send a bit string in ( S , R ) then all individuals in B, in our (A, R) signature scheme, will send a partial result to some (not necessarily trusted) Combiner C. Then C combines the partial results and sends a bit string similar as S would. Observe that no interaction is required between the shareholders and C to create the bit string (see Figure 1 ). It must be impossible for C to impersonate when C is +For a group G, the exponent is the smallest integer e such that Vz E G , x e = 1. collaborating with any k -1 shareholders and for C to substitute a message when C receives additionally k partial results (for the same message). We assume that neither C nor the shareholders will jam the signature generation.
3 Threshold RSA signatures Let n = pq where p , q are safe primes. One condition for p to be a safe prime is that p = 2p' + 1 where p' is a prime [BB78, BB79] , similarly q = 2q' + 1. Normally RSA is defined with the d function, however it could just as well have been defined with the A functions. Due to the method we chose n note that A(n) = 2p'q'. The secret key is d which was chosen at random such that gcd(d, A(")) = 1. So d is odd. An RSA signature of a message m is sm 5 md mod n . In our method, each individual i E D will generate a modified share a i ,~ such that CiE8 q8 d -1 mod A(n). Each i E B will calculate the partial result s,,i,~ calculates S,,, rna,.e mod n and send it to C . To create the signature, C rn. niEB s,,,,~ mod n.
Polynomial approach
As in the Lagrange interpolation scheme of [Sh] , let f(z) be a polynomial of degree L -1 such that f ( 0 ) is the secret. However, parts of our calculations will be performed over the integers rather than over a field and f (0) d -1 mod X(n). We now discuss a method to calculate a ; ,~ which circumvents the problem of calculating inverses [DF90] even when X(n) must remain secret to the shareholders. To simplify our discussionq, we assume that X(n) = 2p'q', where p' and q' are large primes. This implies that not all z, -z j have inverses modulo 2p'g' (e.g., when z, -2, is even, it has no inverse). Let all the i i be odd and all f ( q ) be even and let f(0)
share distribution center will choose p , q and d, and will send to each i the share Observe now that no inverses have to be calculated by the shareholder because The correctness of the previous two equations is proven in Theorem 3.1. Let q , ,~ = n j e a (zi -Z j ) n j E B ( O -r j ) , then the modified share, ai,B, is an integer where
Due to exponentiation, the threshold scheme is actually performed in Zq,), thus this is not conflicting with [BS] . The above scheme seems to be secure. Some modifications are needed to prove that the scheme is as secure as RSA (see final paper).
Theorem 3.1 When n = pq for p , q safe p r i m e s and Id1 2 2, the above scheme creates an RSA signature.
Proof: (Sketch) Even though X(n) is not known by the shareholders, the exponentiation operation is performed modulo X ( n ) . Using the Chinese remainder theorem the V I n general, i t is sufficient to assume that X(n)/2 is the product of large primes. I 1 above computation is correct modulo 2 (since it is always even) and modulo p'q' (since the inverses exist). Thus the scheme generates the correct signature. 1 I 3.2 The use of extensions of rings Since in the above method qi,u becomes a very large integer when 1 is large, we discuss a different method using algebraic extensions (see [Jags] ) over ZA (,,) . Let u be a root to ,,. We remind the reader that an algebra A over a commutative ring R is a pair of A, a ring and an R-module A where the additive group for the ring and the R-module are the same and
We can now view ZA (,,) [U] as a n algebra over . Z A (~) .
The regular representation of an algebra A is the map z -z~ for each t E A where z~ is the map a i zu in A . This is a homomorphism from A to EndRAll. A matrix representation p ( t ) for zL can be made for each z E A .
When the inverse of t exits, we define
This framework provides us with an alternative method to the polynomial approach. Now f(z) is a polynomial over ZA (,,,[u] Modification of the extension ring method can enhance our threshold scheme over some Abelian groups (see Section 4.2) as done in [DFSl] .
We now analyze the order of the number of multiplications needed in the modified RSA by one shareholder. Fur that purpose we analyze the largest coefficient in absolute value of q:,B. Let la/ denote the absolute value of the integer a and let p ( z ) = z h + uh-lzh-* +. ..+a0 be an irreducible polynomial mod A(n) with u a root and a; < A(n). (mod A ( n ) , p ( u ) ) . Since A(n) is unknown to k -1 shareholders, each of them cannot do the above reduction. So we define c"(u) c(u) modp(u) without with j > ( h -1). Thus by calculating the absolute value of the largest coefficient in C"(u), we find that it is less than hBB'X(n)(*-'). When the largest coefficient of y;(u) are in absolute value less than A , then by induction the absolute value of the largest coefficient in yl(u) . y2(u). .
-w(u) is at most hT-'ATX(n)(T-l)(h-l)
. We now will use this formula to calculate the largest coefficient in absolute value of njEs,,+i z j and of
c(u)
reducing it modulo A(n) and we use the relation uh = -a,,-lu'-' -. . . -uo for cj Ilj Ea, j # i -1.
It is easy to see t h a t the largest coefficient in absolute value of f l j c a , j + i z j is less than: hL-2X(n)(k-2)h+1. The calculation of (G) cannot be made in a straight forward manner since A(n) is not known to the shareholders. It is clear that using the extended Euclidean algorithm over the rationals, that (G) and N(z; -z j ) can be computed**. We note that the absolute value of the quotients computed in the Euclidean algorithm are bounded [Kn] by a = X(n)2h-1(h + l),,. We also note that the extended Euclidean algorithm terminates in log(h) steps. So using the extended Euclidean algorithm the largest coefficient in absolute value of ( -1 is less than 0 = log(h)h'o~(h)-la'o~h). So the largest coefficient in absolute value of njEB,j#i(q) is
because h must be much smaller than A(n). We now recall from the first method that q i ,~ = ( n j g~, j~~( z i -Zj))(-lT-') n j c a , j f i zi. Observe that the x; in qi,a are integers.
Let Di,B be the absolute value of q i ,~. In fact xi < 2i, so Di,s
depending from 1, k, h , Cp(l), and log(X(n)) one should choose one of the methods.
Evidently we can see t h a t the extension ring method can be improved when one optimizes the norms (C,(I)) and h. It seems as though this optimization problem is difficult.
A third method t o obtain threshold RSA signatures, which can be used, is based on matrices where the determinant is small. This is similar to the method used i n [DF90] . Each of the methods of the threshold RSA signatures performs differently depending on k, I , h, Cp(% and log(A(n)).
~~ "In some cases this method does not find the actual conjugate and the actual norm. As long as shareholders and the key distributor use the same method it does not matter in our context. 4 A provably secure threshold authentication scheme
Attempt a t a group based liomoinorphic threshold scheme
We first want to develop a homomorphic threshold scheme [Be] for an Abelian group G whose exponent has only large prime factors. Let eh be a multiple of the exponent of G such that e(G is of similar form as e G . Let (g1, yz, ' . . gm} generate G and e& and gj be known to the key distribution center. Define secret s = gY1gT . .g&-. For 0 < j 5 m, let f j ( z ) be independently chosen polynomials of degree k -1 such that f,(O) = ?j..
Similar t o the method of Section 3.1, the key distribution center calculates
In this scheme, however, the share for i is A, = g1 K;,r g2 K i , l . . .sE',' E G and the modified share for i in B is u r ,~ = (A,)Oa," where q i . 6 is defined as in Section 3.1. Thus s = nIEB a i ,~. This scheme is not practical since the key distribution center must solve the discrete log problem and additionally know the generators and e&. A similar remark in the context of multiplicative sharing schemes was made in [Be] . For many groups, the discrete logarithm is considered hard [Od, MVO] .
Homomorphic threshold scheme over an Abelian group
Since the first attempt is not practical for most purposes, we propose a variation which requzres only that e& zs known t o the key distrzbutor and has only large prime factors. Let ( A l , A2, . . . , Ak-1) be independently randomly chosen elements in G. Then by letting X, = { 1,2, . . ., -l , j } with j 2 Ic, the key distribution center can calculate
The use of Aj is as in Section 4.1. Observe that any combination of k -1 shareholders do not learn anything new about e G , the exponent of G, when given the fact that eG has only large prime factors. The following concept goes further. The concept of a sharing scheme not revealing anything about the secret or anything else is called a zeroknowledge sharing scheme [DF91] . We remind the reader that knowing the exponent of a zero-knowledge homomorphic threshold scheme for any 1 and L no matter what the exponent e G is [DFSI] .
The provable scheme
A provable secure autheniication scheme based on a zero-knowledge version of [GMR] was presented in [Des] . Its advantage is that no authentication tree is needed.
Let R E D, where D, = { z E 2, I (x I n ) = 1 and 0 < z < n / 2 ) = G and n = p . q where p and Q safe primes such that: p 3 mod 8 and q 3 7 mod 8. The tuple ( R , n) is our public key. First observe that Dn(*) is an Abelian group in which the operation is works when one knows 'm and ' z (see also [Go] ). We recall that if n is as in Section 3.1, then the exponent of D, is p'q', satisfying our conditions. In our scheme the key distributor gives shares of 'm and 'x using our group based threshold scheme.
In a homomorphic threshold scheme when Aj is a share for s and A(i is a share for s', Aj . A(i is a share for s . 5 ' . When I(M)I 5 a , each shareholder can calculate, using his shares, his part of fAG1(Rj), which we call 5'1,~.
TO authenticate a message the following protocol is executed. message M to the receiver, called the verifier I/. Then repeat In1 times:
First C sends the
Step 1 The shareholder i E B randomly chooses a t, E D, and squares it I(A4)I t' imes (mod n) and sends X i to C. Then C calculates X = I(M)I) to obtain X , = ti2 fli lu, (mod n) and sends X to V .
Step 2 V sends a random bit E to C , who broadcasts it.
Step 3 Each shareholder calculates yi = t , . ( S~, M )~ (mod n ) and sends it to C . Then C calculates Y = n, yi (mod n ) and sends it to V .
Step 4 V verifies Y by using multiplications, and the organization's public key.
Our method does not leak the factors of n to a collusion of k -1 shareholders. It is not difficult to prove that if k is polynomial in In( that the view that C has is easy to simulate, so that it not necessary to trust C . So the shareholders could have secure workstations using an insecure local network to communicate with C (who communicates with the verifier).
Observe that the distributor in the above does not need to be one trusted individual.
Mental games [GMW] allow for this.
An unconditionally secure version
We now develop a method for the threshold unconditionally secure authenticators using a geometric scheme. The method will be performed in Z;+l, a ( k + 1)-dimensional vector space over a large prime p . We denote one of the axis in Zi+' as M and points as p = ( x 1 ,~2 , . . . ,~t , n) E Z;+' where n is the M coordinate. Let P,, called the message plane for m, contain all points satisfying the equation n = m. A secret line I, known to the receiver, R, and not parallel to Po is generated by the key distribution center D (see Figure 2) ; D may be R. TO generate the codeword, each individual i E L? will send to C a k-dimensional random plane Ri,m which contains the intersection of A; and P,,,. C can now generate the codeword cm given the k planes R,,m and the plane P,. Since the planes are random, C will gain no information about I , other than the point pm E I, and therefore C cannot perform a substitution attack even if k -1 individuals would help additionally.
iZ projective geometry method is easily derived from the above method. In [DF], a method based on poiynomials to achieve the above is given.
Conclusion
Often it is desired that the power to sign or authenticate messages is shared. Key sharing schemes on their own are not suited for this because once used the key is revealed. Our heuristic (RSA), proven secure and unconditionally secure schemes solve this problem.
In our scheme the shareholders do not have to interact with one another, while in mental games they do heavily. In all of our schemes we assume that the shareholders (senders) and receiver have secure workstations but the network and servers are not necessarily secure. It is an open problem to determine which systems in general can be executed in a non-interactive distributive way.
